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Latin American Trade Liberalization
Sam Laird*
In recent years, Latin American countries significantly re-
formed their trade policies. Several Latin American countries
became members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. In addition, there was an increase in the number and
quality of regional trade agreements. In December 1994, at the
Summit of the Americas in Miami, thirty-four nations met to
discuss a future Free Trade Area of the Americas. These trade
reforms are part of a larger economic liberalization that includes
changes in the internal macroeconomic policies of Latin Ameri-
can nations. The trade reforms reinforce the internal changes
and, to some extent, prevent Latin American governments from
pursuing internal policy reversals. However, the current trade
reforms will not successfully complete the overall economic lib-
eralization of Latin America without help from additional
measures.
This Article discusses Latin American economic liberaliza-
tion, from the integration agreements of the early 1960s through
the trade liberalization policies beginning in the 1980s. Part I
traces the evolution of Latin American trade policy during this
period. Part II focuses on Latin American tariff barriers, while
Part III focuses on non-tariff measures. Part IV examines the
future of Latin American trade policy with regard to the Uru-
guay Round agreements, particularly with respect to regional
integration. This Article concludes that efforts are needed to re-
fine the policies of privatization, government procurement, and
competition in order to increase the contestability of Latin
American markets. The proposed Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas will not address these issues, but can deeply contribute to
the credibility of the trade reforms.
* Trade Policy Review Division, World Trade Organization (WTO). The
views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of the WTO or its members. The author wishes to express his
thanks to Willy Alfaro, Peter Tulloch and Jorge Vigano for their valuable com-
ments, and to Ramiro Guzman for providing the data in Tables 2 and 3 from
UNCTAD's Data Base on Trade Control Measures.
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I. EVOLUTION OF LATIN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY
Until the early 1980s, when these countries undertook
macroeconomic reforms and trade reforms in response to a debt
crisis, Latin American countries generally followed import-sub-
stitution industrialization policies. Such policies were heavily
dependent upon the widespread use of non-tariff measures
(NTMs). Regional agreements, like the Latin American Free-
Trade Area (LAFTA), the Central American Common Market
(CACM), 2 and the Andean Group,3 extended these policies to the
regional level through a complex web of limited preferences and
production-sharing agreements. Latin American countries
joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)4 pri-
marily with hopes of improved access to foreign markets, includ-
ing by means of "special and differential treatment" under
GATT.5
1. Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin Amer-
ican Free Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty), Feb. 18, 1960, INTER-AMERI-
CAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO
THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA 207 (1968) [hereinafter LAFTA].
Signatories to LAFTA included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ec-
uador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id.
2. General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13,
1960, El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., 455 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 4,
1961) [hereinafter CACM]. Costa Rica later acceded to the CACM. GENERAL
SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 417 (1985) (effective Nov. 9, 1963).
3. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, Bol.-
Colom.-Chile-Ecuador-Peru, 8 I.L.M. 910. Venezuela later acceded to the
Agreement. GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
supra note 2, at 360 (effective Jan. 1, 1974). Chile later denounced the Agree-
ment. Id. (effective Oct. 30, 1976).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Apr. 15,
1994, in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 21, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter
GATT 1994]. The Final Act of the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement) were
signed at the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting in April 1994. The WTO Agree-
ment includes the original GATT 1947 as amended.
5. GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. XXXVI:8 ("The developed contracting
parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade nego-
tiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-devel-
oped contracting parties"). In 1965, the contracting parties enacted Part IV to
the GATT, embodying the concept of special and differential treatment. In
1979, as part of the Tokyo Round, the contracting parties agreed on the Genera-
lized System of Preferences (GSP). Differential and More Favourable Treat-
ment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Doc.
L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), reprinted in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, 26th Supp. BISD 203 (1980). For a further explanation, see ROBERT E.
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Populism led to overly expansive macroeconomic policies
that relied upon deficit financing and generalized controls while
disregarding basic economic equilibria.6 Policymakers rejected
monetarist orthodoxy, and were instead influenced by struc-
turalist supply-side solutions. They believed that idle capacity
would provide leeway for the economic expansion needed to im-
prove living standards without running inflationary risks.7
Policymakers would accomplish this supply-side solution
through deficit financing covered by foreign borrowing. When
bottlenecks arose, usually from a lack of foreign exchange,
policymakers rejected devaluation as an option because of the
likely adverse consequences for inflation and living standards.
Some also argued that devaluation would not work because
of institutional rigidities. For example, under existing systems
of land tenure, it was difficult to increase agricultural produc-
tion in response to price incentives. If agricultural production
did increase, gains would be offset by a decline in the terms of
trade. Lacking equivalent domestically produced goods, imports
would not fall. Thus, some argued that devaluation would not
improve the trade balance, but would lower real incomes and
accelerate inflation. Nevertheless, each time the economic situ-
ation deteriorated, governments were usually forced to resort to
price realignments, devaluation, exchange controls, and import
restrictions. In the end, the population was worse off than
before the pursuit of these supply-side solutions.
Past policies that favored import-competing manufacturing
industry were largely influenced by Raill Prebisch's work on the
secular decline in the terms of trade for agricultural commodi-
ties" and by the perception that only manufacturing could pro-
vide stability and jobs. Countries used import restrictions to
assist the rapid development of the new manufacturing sector,
under the infant-industry or infant-economy protection argu-
ment. Occasionally, however, the policy mix was so complex
that it became partly self-defeating. If an industry complained
HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT SYSTEM (Thames Essay No. 50 for
the Trade Policy Research Centre, 1987).
6. See THE MACROECONOMICS OF POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA (Rudiger
Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards eds., 1991).
7. For a discussion of the "monetarist" versus "structuralist" debate, see
Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Economic Development and Inflation with Special
Reference to Latin America, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT No. 1, DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND
PROGRAMMES 127-47 (1964).
8. RAVL PREBISCH, CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT-LATIN AMERICA'S GREAT
TASK (1971).
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about the high costs of steel or capital goods (protected under a
development plan), then exemptions or tax breaks for invest-
ment would be granted to offset the high costs. This scenario
could repeat itself throughout the economy, creating layers of
protection or insulation not only from imports but from the ef-
fects of other policies, such that it became difficult to ascertain
the net effect of the combination of policies. Clearly, for many
Latin American countries with a comparative advantage in agri-
culture, the agricultural sector bore the brunt of such policies.
The agricultural sector suffered from explicit and implicit taxes,
including burdens imposed by multiple exchange rates,9 thus ex-
acerbating rural poverty and encouraging the drift to urban
areas.
While episodes of trade liberalization occurred before the
1980s, most eventually failed because they lacked coordination
in the application of different policies. These failures stimulated
extensive research on the timing and sequencing of reforms and
led to wide agreement that macroeconomic reforms must pre-
cede trade reforms. 10 There are several successful counter-ex-
amples suggesting that it is possible, and perhaps even
desirable, to initiate trade policy reforms with macroeconomic
reforms, if for no other reason than to give credibility to the pol-
icy reorientation."
The Latin American reforms of the 1980s involved compre-
hensive macro and microeconomic packages, replacing wide-
spread NTMs with moderate tariffs. 12 Latin American countries
initiated these reform programs over short periods, thus intui-
tively lessening the risk of miscalculation on the timing and se-
quencing of reforms. The reforms derived credibility from the
fact that they were home-grown, introduced by several U.S.
trained economists, and supported by the international lending
institutions. Change was possible because of disillusionment
9. Anne 0. Krueger et al., Agricultural Incentives in Developing Coun-
tries: Measuring the Effect of Sectoral and Economywide Policies, 2 WORLD
BANK ECON. REV. 255, 266-67 (1988).
10. For a comprehensive description and analysis of previous liberalization
episodes, see LIBERALIZING FOREIGN TRADE (Demetris Papageorgiou et al. eds.,
1991). See also VINOD THOMAS ET AL., BEST PRACTICES IN TRADE POLICY REFORM
(1991); STANLEY FISCHER & VINOD THOMAS, POLICIES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT (The World Bank, Policy, Research, and External Affairs WPS 459, 1990).
11. DAi RODRICK, TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY REFORM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF RECENT THEORY AND EVIDENCE 47 (National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4417, 1993).
12. See infra part II (describing the shift toward lower tariffs and away
from NTMs).
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with the old order, along with popular recognition of the need for
drastic measures to counter the debt crisis, hyperinflation, fall-
ing real incomes, and rising unemployment in overcrowded cit-
ies. These new measures followed the fundamentals of economic
orthodoxy: fiscal and monetary constraints with initially fixed
exchange rates. However, economically heterodox measures in-
cluded price and income controls as key supporting measures
under the Mexican system of consensus-building pacts (Pactos
de Solidaridad), and floating exchange rates as a feature of re-
cent reforms in Peru and Bolivia. Demonstrated success from
early reforms in Chile, and later reforms in Mexico and Bolivia,
eased the spread of the reform process.
The Mexican financial crisis of December 1994 does not ap-
pear to require any modification of these fundamentals.l 3 A cur-
rency depreciation was generally expected in the period before
the 1994 Mexican presidential election. Large amounts of
money began leaving the country even before the Chiapas upris-
ing in January 199414 and the later assassination of PRI candi-
date Luis Donaldo Colosio.' 5 Even by late 1993 reserves began
to fall. The managed float of the currency did not proceed at a
sufficient rate to counter the decline in reserves. A greater rate
of depreciation in the pre-election period would have required
tighter fiscal and monetary measures, with a negative effect on
real incomes. Presently, another government pact with organ-
ized labor, promises of democratic reforms, and the U.S. backed
rescue effort seem sufficient to help in the recovery of confi-
dence.' 6 The already growing Mexican exports should receive a
13. One commentator argued that despite Mexico's financial crisis, failing
to proceed with Chile's NAFTA membership in a timely fashion would damage
the prospects for the gradual development of a hemispheric free-trade commu-
nity. Shirley Christian, Don't Let Mexico's Woes Spoil Our Commitments' to
Chile, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1995, at A13. U.S. Trade Representative Mickey
Kantor downplayed any negative impact of Mexico's financial crisis on plans to
expand NAFTA, stating that Latin America "is where we are going to find our
greatest growth over the next number of years." Helene Cooper, Administra-
tion Says Mexico's Crisis Won't Affect Nafta Expansion Push, WALL. ST. J., Feb.
10, 1995, at A2.
14. See Gregory Katz, Death Toll Tops 100 in Mexican Uprising, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 4, 1994, at Al.
15. See Damian Fraser & Stephen Fidler, Mexico in Crisis After Killing,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1994, at 1.
16. See Tim Carrington et al., Quick Fix: Clinton Hastily Drops Mexico
Rescue Plan, Gives New Aid Instead, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1995, at Al (outlining
the aid plan to Mexico); Paul B. Carroll & Dianne Solis, Mexican Stocks, Peso
Post Sharp Gains Amid Relief Over New Rescue Package, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1,
1995, at A6 (noting that Mexican stocks soared to their biggest one-day gain
1995]
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boost, although U.S. inputs into Mexican production will be
more costly. Due to its obligations under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),17 Mexico is unlikely to resort
to trade measures as a knee-jerk reaction to the financial crisis,
as it did after the 1982 debt crisis and earlier economic crises.
By not resorting to a solution dependent on trade measures,
Mexico is using macroeconomic tools to solve macroeconomic
problems.
The active role of Latin American countries in the Uruguay
Round also lends credibility to the trade policy reforms. Since
the Uruguay Round began in 1986, many Latin American coun-
tries acceded to the GATT: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay and Vene-
zuela. Usually, accession involved the binding of all most-fa-
vored-nation (MFN) tariffs at ceiling levels ranging from 20% to
50% and, occasionally, the binding of commitments on NTMs as
well. In the Uruguay Round, all Latin American contracting
parties made comprehensive binding ceiling commitments and
substantial commitments in other areas including services and
intellectual property. While these changes do not always lead to
immediate increases in market access, they reaffirm the serious-
ness of the reforms of the last decade.
With regard to sub-regional agreements, memberships in
NAFTA and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) give Mexico's reforms considerable credibil-
ity. Credibility may be more important than improved access to
the U.S. market, where Mexico already received favorable treat-
ment, especially under the U.S. value-added tariff (VAT) provi-
sions.' 8 Other sub-regional agreements, while appearing much
since 1988 and the peso regained over 10% of its value against the U.S. dollar
as news of the rescue package spread throughout Mexico's financial markets).
17. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
32 I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605.
18. Under these provisions, imports which contain U.S. materials are sub-
ject to the duty only on the value added abroad. For example, if U.S. textiles
were made into garments in Mexico, then the value of the U.S. textile would be
deducted on computing the value for duty on the garment exported from Mexico
to the United States. One of the reasons for establishing large in-bond produc-
tion facilities (maquiladoras) in Mexico was to help Mexican companies take
advantage of these provisions through special investment incentives and
streamlined customs facilities. These provisions cover U.S. imports under Har-
monized Tariff Schedule (HTS) subheadings 9802.00.60 (metal of U.S. origin
processed in a foreign location and returned for further U.S. processing) and
9802.00.80 (goods containing U.S.-made components), formerly imports under
items 806.30 and 807.00 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS).
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stronger than earlier efforts, 19 do not contribute to the credibil-
ity of Mexican reforms because they have yet to show they can
stand the test of time.
The most important recent development is the announce-
ment of plans for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).20
Thirty-four countries met at the Summit of the Americas in
Miami on December 9-11, 1994. The year 2005 was set as the
deadline for completing negotiations, and the countries agreed
that there will be "concrete progress" before the end of the cen-
tury. As with NAFTA, U.S. participation in the FTAA lends con-
siderable credibility to the accord and pushes liberalization
further than currently planned in many Latin American
countries.
II. THE SHIFT TOWARD LOWER TARIFFS
Before the 1980s, Latin American tariffs were generally
high, unbound, and set in tiers that escalated tariffs according to
the level of processing. Preferences were granted to ranges of
goods defined in bilateral arrangements under LAFTA, which
became the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) in
1980.21 The published tariffs often bore little resemblance to the
duties collected because of the many exemptions. In Argentina,
for example, the average nominal tariff was reduced from 98% to
49% during the Martinez de Hoz period (1976-81).22 In 1988,
the average nominal tariff stood at over 30%, but the ratio of
duty collected to total imports was approximately 2% between
1970 and 1988.23 Tariffs thus were largely irrelevant for protec-
tive purposes primarily because of the prevalence of NTMs.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 61-65.
20. Americas Summit Leaders Back Historic Trade Declaration, 11 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1915 (Dec. 14, 1994).
21. In 1980, the Treaty of Montevideo superseded LAFTA. See Treaty of
Montevideo (1980) Establishing the Latin American Integration Association
(LAIA), Aug. 12, 1980, GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERI-
CAN STATES, supra note 2, at 353 (entered into force Mar. 18, 1981).
22. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF
ARGENTINA 1992, vol. I, at 86 (May 1992) (citing JULIO NoGugS, PROTECCION
COMERCIAL Y CAMBIARA: UNA INTERPRETACION DE LA EXPERIENCIA ARGENTINA
DURANTE 1976-77 (Banco Central del la Repfbica Argentina, Serie de Estudios
Tecnicos No. 52, 1983)).
23. Id. The existence of preferential arrangements is one reason for the
difference between average nominal rates and duty collected. However, there
were also many waivers, including waivers for state-owned enterprises, and in-
efficiencies in collection.
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There has been a recent shift toward tariffs and away from
wide-ranging NTMs as the primary form of protection. This
shift represents an important increase in the transparency of
trade protection. Greater security of market access is due to the
recent accessions of Latin American countries to the GATT and
because Uruguay Round negotiations bound almost all tariffs at
ceiling rates of 35%.24 Market access improved because the ap-
plied MFN rates are now substantially lower than the bound
rates: applied tariff averages (unweighted) were reduced to be-
tween 10% and 12%.25 Although the lower MFN rates allow
some room for a tariff increase, the ceiling bindings ensure that
they cannot return to the earlier high levels.
The rationalization of the structure of applied tariffs in-
creased the transparency in trade protection. In a few cases,
moderate uniform tariffs have been introduced; in other cases,
there are fewer broad bands of tariffs in which a less pronounced
tariff escalation has been maintained. This tariff structure, with
higher tariffs at later stages of processing, provides the manu-
facturing sector with higher levels of effective protection for its
value added than is evident from the nominal rates on the fin-
ished goods. In addition, many exemptions have been elimi-
nated so that current nominal tariffs more closely reflect the
amount collected.
Table 1 shows recent average tariffs for a range of Latin
American countries. Bolivia (10%) and Chile (11%) have
adopted very moderate uniform tariffs and thus have effective
tariff protection at the same level. Most developing countries in
the region have adopted a tiered structure of escalating rates
but with moderate total averages, such as Argentina (12%), Co-
lombia (11%), Brazil (14%), and Uruguay (20%).26 There is a
tendency to avoid zero minimum rates, and most maximum
24. Peru bound its entire tariff at a ceiling rate of 30%. GENERAL AGREE-
MENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF PERU 1994, Vol. I, at 65
(June 1994). Costa Rica reduced its ceiling binding from 55% to 45%. WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF COSTA RICA 1995 (forthcoming
1995).
25. OECD unweighted averages are typically between 5% and 10%,
although New Zealand's 1987 average was 17.6%. Import weighted averages
are much lower, ranging from 3.5% to 5%. For further information, see GATT
TRADE POLICY REVIEWS 1989-94 of the individual OECD countries.
26. Since January 1, 1995, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have adopted
the common external tariff of MERCOSUR, with some important exceptions in
each case. Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Treaty Establishing a Com-
mon Market, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1044 [hereinafter MERCOSUR]. It is
expected that the average for these countries will now be between 12% and
14%.
202 [Vol. 4:195
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Table 1. Summary of Tariff Regimes of Selected Latin
American Countries
Tariffs
Country Simple Average (%) Comments
Argentina 12.2 Specific rates are 5, 13 and 22%. Few
(1992) exceptions are allowed. Frequent revisions
in recent years reduced the average from
30% in 1989. The average fell from 98% to
49% in 1976-77.
Bolivia 10.0 Rates are generally uniform. The average
(1992) decreased from 20% in 1990, except 5% on
capital goods. The pre-1985 average was
12.1%.
Brazil 14.2 Specific rates are 0, 5, 10-15, 20 and 30-
(1993) 35%. Recent reforms reduced the average
from 51% in 1988. Pronounced escalation
exists.
Chile 11.0 Rates are generally uniform, except certain
(1992) rates in agriculture. The average fluctuated
from over 90% (1973) to 10% (1979) to 35%
(1984) to 20% (1985) to 15% (1988) and to
11% (1992). Dispersion and escalation were
largely eliminated by the early 1970s.
Colombia 11.0 Rates range from 0-20% in 5 categories. In
(1992) 1987, the average was 31% and there were
21 categories.
Mexico 12.5 Specific rates are 0, 5, 10, 15 and 20%. The
(1993) average was 27% in 1982 and 22.6% in
1986. There is some escalation. Dispersion
was reduced.
Uruguay 21.5 Specific rates are 0, 10, 17 and 24%, with a
(1992) few exceptions at 40%. The average was
simplified under 11 reforms and reduced
from over 700% in 1968.
Venezuela 10.0 The average is understated due to trade
(1991) weighting. The maximum rate is 40%. The
average fell from 35% in 1988. Dispersion
exists.
NOTE: The introduction of the MERCOSUR common external tariffs, with certain
exceptions for each country, is not expected to greatly affect the above
averages for MERCOSUR countries, although tariff structures may be
affected.
SouRcEs: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIsFS AND TRADE, TRADE POLICY REVIEWS
1989-93 (data on Colombia and Venezuela); GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFS AND TRADE, Council Overview of Developments in International
Trade and the Trading System: Annual Report by the Director General,
GATT Doc. No. C/RM/OV/3/Rev.1 (May 1, 1992) (data on Columbia and
Venezuela).
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rates are set between 30% and 40%. With tariffs structured in
this way, foodstuffs and basic commodities attract the lower
rates. Intermediate products such as producer goods receive the
mid-range rates. Finally, finished goods such as automobiles
benefit from the higher rates and, of course, from effective rates
that are even higher than the nominal rates.27
In the past, tariffs used by developing countries would often
protect industries in which other developing countries were be-
coming significant exporters. 28 Presently, tariff protection by
Latin American countries is primarily directed at the exports of
industrial countries. Although protection can operate against
their own exports,29 Latin American countries can counter this
to a certain extent with greater use of duty-drawback schemes
and rebates of domestic taxes such as the VAT. Thus some of
their more highly protected industries, such as the automobile
industry, may also be important export industries, as in Brazil
and Mexico.
Although tariff preferences were widespread throughout the
region, it is difficult to describe precisely their importance in di-
verting trade. Each preference was established bilaterally or
among groups of countries under the LAIA umbrella with differ-
ent product coverage and degrees of preference.30 The impor-
tance of these preferences may increase as countries sign more
comprehensive and meaningful agreements.
Transparency could be improved by using a consistent value
on which duties are applied. Most Latin American countries
27. For example, one study showed that 1994 Brazilian tariffs on
automobiles would move to an average of 34.2%, while the effective rates would
be 62.5%. Honorario Kume & Guida Piani, The Politics of Protection in Brazil
7-8 (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Minnesota Journal of
Global Trade).
28. See generally J. Michael Finger & Sam Laird, Protection in Developed
and Developing Countries-An Overview, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. No. 6, at 9
(1987).
29. KENNETH W. CLEMENTS & LARRY A. SJAASTAD, How PROTEcTION TAXES
EXPORTERS 49 (Thames Essay No. 39 for the Trade Policy Research Centre,
1984).
30. A description of LAIA preferences is contained in a series of biennial
reports to the GATT. See, e.g., Latin American Integration Association (LAJA):
Report on Activities 1989-1990, GATT Doc. 116946 (Dec. 20, 1991); GATT Doc.
116985 (Mar. 5, 1992). LAA preferences are also discussed in GATT TRADE
POLICY REVIEWS. As an example, Bolivia, as a least developed country, benefits
from this association by receiving bilateral preferences for certain products,
sub-regional preferences and expanded preferences on an LAIA-wide basis.
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF BOLIVIA
1993, vol. I, at 62 (July 1993).
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continue to apply the Brussels Definition of Value under the
Customs Cooperation Council rather than the GATT definition
under the Customs Valuation Code. 31 The Brussels definition is
more flexible in deciding the value for duty and need not con-
form to the transaction value, whereas the GATT Code places a
greater emphasis on the transaction value as the value for duty.
This means that the ad valorem rate as stated in customs tariffs
may be substantially lower than the ad valorem equivalent of
the rate collected concerning the transaction value.3 2 Under the
Single Undertaking of the Uruguay Round, however, members
of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) will be obliged to
apply the customs valuation rules of that organization as de-
rived from the GATT system. Reference prices similarly in-
crease the ad valorem equivalent of collected duties and have
been very important in some countries.33 Variable levies, which
have similar effects, are less important in Latin America and
will be phased out under the Uruguay Round commitments on
agriculture.34
III. THE DECLINE OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES
In the past, non-tariff measures (NTMs) were typically
broad-based licensing systems, affecting all imports, and sup-
ported by strict foreign-exchange controls. Almost all imports
needed a prior license from the authorities who used the license
applications to check on the expected level of imports. The au-
thorities refused license applications if the expected level of im-
ports exceeded a predetermined quota. As often as not,
authorities would not decide the permitted level of imports in
31. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Implementation of Arti-
cle VII-Customs Valuation, Apr. 12, 1979, art. VII, 34 U.S.T. 1151-1, 1151-3 to
-13, 1235 U.N.T.S. 126 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1981).
32. For example, if the export price or declared transaction value for an
item is $100 and the customs duty is 15%, the duty is $15. However, if Customs
determines that the value for duty is $200, then the duty is $30, or 30% of the
actual transaction value. Most customs services have confidential reference
manuals which they use to check the declared value against what they believe
to be the export price in the country of origin. These are used to counter fraud,
whether by under-declaration (to avoid customs duties) or over-declaration (to
move money out of the country). In some cases, these may be more or less for-
mal reference prices intended to provide protection to domestic production
against price fluctuations, whether from exchange rate movements or other-
wise, or to counter dumping.
33. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
34. Agreement on Agriculture, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, in GATT
SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONs at 39, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994).
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advance; instead, they would modify the level during the year
according to the availability of foreign exchange. 35 Licensing
systems thus provided comprehensive administrative controls so
imports could be quickly curtailed, when required, for balance-
of-payments purposes. 36
Table 2 shows that for selected Latin American countries
the current share of trade covered by NTMs is 10.8%. This
share is lower than that for major OECD countries, and agricul-
tural "tariffication"37 in the Uruguay Round implementation
will further reduce this share. (The new, higher tariffs on agri-
cultural items, however, will also have the effect of increasing
total tariff averages). Latin American countries thus have
moved away from volume-control measures and toward greater
use of price control and monitoring measures. However, cus-
toms valuation methods and government procurement proce-
dures remain important measures that are now coming under
greater international disciplines. Foreign exchange allocations
have generally been liberalized, exchange rates have been uni-
fied and, even where parallel markets still exist, premiums over
the official rate are small or have disappeared completely.38
In Table 2, Brazil and Mexico stand out due to the contin-
ued presence of state monopolies and non-automatic licensing,
which includes local content regulations and export-perform-
ance requirements in the UNCTAD classification. Measures
against imports not covered in Table 2 include reference prices,
customs valuation procedures, supplementary and even discrim-
inatory charges on imports, technical barriers, and government
procurement procedures. Previously, developing countries usu-
35. For this reason, many central banks in Latin America had, and often
still have, an important influence on trade policy and its application.
36. The broad-based use of licensing systems contrasted with the situation
in industrial countries where measures were used to protect specific sectors
subject to rapidly shifting comparative advantage. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, PROTECTIONISM AND STRucTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY: REPORT BY THE UNCTAD SECRETARIAT at 6, U.N. Doc. TD/B/
888/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.D.14 (1982); see also SAM LAIRD & ALEXANDER
YEATS, QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR TRADE-BARRIER ANALYSIS 98-120 (1990).
37. "Tariffication" refers to the replacement of agricultural NTMs, such as
import quotas or variable levies, with tariffs or tariff rate quotas that provide
an equivalent level of import protection. In general, this requires increasing
the existing nominal tariffs in the agricultural sector.
38. Nominal exchange rates, however, are subject to different policies such
as pegging to the U.S. dollar (Argentina), crawling pegs (sometimes prean-
nounced as with Mexico until the 1994 currency crisis), or managed floats (Bra-
zil). INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND
EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS: 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 588, 591 (1994).
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ally applied NTMs without discriminating against specific
groups of trading partners, 39 though the production-sharing and
economic-complementarity agreements under the LAIA favored
trade with other Latin American countries. Latin American
countries rarely used discriminatory NTMs, like voluntary ex-
port restraints (VERs) or multilateral financing agencies
(MFAs), or antidumping actions against trading partners. The
blanketing effect of import licensing reduced the need for dis-
criminatory NTMs. In addition, where import licenses were un-
available, reference prices and other means limited imports in
an administrative manner. The current shift away from quanti-
tative restrictions makes NTM preferences much less
significant.
Previously, reference price systems or special customs valu-
ation procedures were often used to protect domestic industries
against sudden price decreases, which were perhaps due to
"dumping" but more likely were associated with abrupt changes
in bilateral exchange rates. These price systems were not in-
cluded in the UNCTAD database shown in Table 2. Uruguay is
one country that made great use of reference or minimum export
prices. 40 Uruguay's experience shows that such price systems
cause major distortions in consumption and production by en-
couraging foreign firms to sell more expensive products to that
country's importers, inducing domestic producers to shift to
lower quality goods, and encouraging domestic consumers to buy
more expensive goods.
Though reference prices are largely disappearing, they
sometimes appear because of antidumping actions-actions be-
coming more common as Latin American countries follow the ex-
ample of the United States. Regarding the United States, J.
Michael Finger and Tracy Murray note that "unfair trade cases
are where the action is because they are broad enough to handle
all the action."41 Antidumping is considered a "respectable" and
legitimate way under the GATT 42 of coping with import surges
39. Finger & Laird, supra note 28, at 18-22.
40. See FEDERICO CHANGANAQUI & PATRICK MESSERLIN, THE ECONOMIC EF-
FECTS OF MINIMUM IMPORT PRICES (WITH AN APPLICATION TO URUGUAY) 13 (The
World Bank, Policy Research WPS No. 903, 1992).
41. J. MICHAEL FINGER & TRACY MURRAY, POLICING UNFAIR IMPORTS-THE
U.S. EXAMPLE 20 (The World Bank, Policy, Research, and External Affairs WPS
No. 401, 1990).
42. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, pmbl., GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, 26th
Supp. BISD 171 (1980) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1980) (agreeing that "anti-
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in a country-specific manner while avoiding the MFN applica-
tion of GATT Article XIX safeguard actions. 43 (Avoidance of ex-
change-rate devaluation may be preferred because of possible
adverse effects on domestic inflation). According to the rhetoric,
antidumping measures are intended to counter the "unfair trade
practices" of other countries. 44 Some developing countries, such
as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, include sunset clauses
in their antidumping legislation. These clauses and other in-
creased disciplines may limit the use of antidumping measures
because of some tightening of the provisions of the Antidumping
Code in the Uruguay Round. 45 The comprehensive membership
required by the Single Undertaking may help to further limit
antidumping measures through increased reporting and inter-
national scrutiny of the use (or abuse) of these measures. Prior
to the end of the Uruguay Round, only Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico had accepted the Antidumping Code.
Most countries use constructed customs values as the basis
for assessing customs duties. Pre-shipment inspection agencies
often provide the relevant information for calculating such val-
ues. Once established, often at levels much higher than cur-
rently prevail in world trade, customs values can remain
constant and operate similarly to reference prices by isolating a
domestic industry from price variations, including secular de-
cline, in international trade. New disciplines emerging from the
application of the Uruguay Round agreements will provide for
important changes in working procedures and the level of
protection.
There are a variety of reasons why import prices are often
unduly high. First, many additional charges, ad valorem or spe-
cific, are applied to imports. These additional charges include:
dumping practices should not constitute an unjustifiable impediment to inter-
national trade").
43. GAT 1947, supra note 4. Article XIX does not explicitly state that
safeguards must be applied on an MFN basis, although this has been the
practice.
44. See Robert E. Hudec, "Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall": The Concept of
Fairness in United States Trade Policy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1990 CONFER-
ENCE OF THE CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 88, 90 (1990). Hudec
indicates that unfairness claims are rhetorical devices used by both proponents
and opponents of antidumping duties. In truth, Hudec states, fairness has little
to do with either position, as trade goals motivate antidumping and other meas-
ures. Id.
45. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, opened for sig-
nature Apr. 15, 1994, in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS at 264, GATT Sales No. 1994-4
(1994).
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consular charges; port charges often unrelated to port costs;
stamp taxes that sometimes barely, if at all, cover the labor costs
of physically sticking stamps to the backs of checks; statistical
taxes that do not always produce timely statistics; and freight
taxes levied on the freight cost of imports. Not all of these taxes
are genuine fees related to the provision of a service; some were
introduced by cash-strapped governments to extract revenues.
The charges do not appear to have been challenged under GATT
Article VIII. (In principle, charges, other than for specific serv-
ices, are intended to be consolidated into the Uruguay Round
bound tariffs, and this may lead to the elimination of some of
these charges). Second, in some countries the application to im-
ports of a charge equivalent to the domestic VAT is not uniform,
as required by GATT Article III. Finally, there are examples of
higher internal freight charges for imports than for exports over
the same route.
Often the ad valorem incidence of supplementary charges
exceeds the ad valorem incidence of the tariff itself. In Brazil,
for example, the tax incidence of the Industrialized Products Tax
(IPI) and the Merchandise Circulation Tax (ICMS) amounts to
100% on an automobile while the customs duty is currently 50%.
The supplementary charges relate to the following: (1) port
services, 50% of the cost of services; (2) the port improvement
tax, 3% of the c.i.f. value; (3) the merchant marine renewal tax,
25% of the c.i.f. value on the first landing and 20% on subse-
quent landings; (4) an import license fee, 1.8% of the f.o.b. value;
(5) a syndicate fee, 2.2% of the c.i.f. value; (6) a brokerage fee, 1%
of the c.i.f. value; (7) a fee for printing forms, a flat US$17; (8) an
administration commission, 1.5% of the c.i.f. value; (9) a 5% air-
port tax; (10) a fee for handling charges, currently US$20; and
(11) a social benefits contribution, 10% of warehouse charges. 46
Brazil is not alone in having such a broad range of charges.
Technical barriers to trade, like health and safety regula-
tions, have been relatively less important obstacles to importing
into developing countries. There are signs, however, that many
countries are increasing the use of these regulations. While
there are some indications that these regulations are used for
protective purposes, there is also a legitimate concern that sub-
standard or out-of-date articles are sold to developing countries
when they can no longer be sold by the exporters of industrial-
ized countries in their home markets.
46. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF
BRAZIL 1992, Vol. I, at 124-26 (1993).
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Government and para-statal procurement practices in sev-
eral Latin American countries are of particular concern due to
the size of the public sector in national production. In some
smaller countries, like Bolivia and Uruguay, public enterprises
account for more than half of national production. Such exten-
sive government participation in production is a relic of a time
when statism was all-pervasive in the region. Governments and
para-statals typically grant a margin of preference to domesti-
cally produced goods (which is also allowed for projects financed
by UNDP and the World Bank). A project design or purchasing
specification may be prepared so that only local suppliers can
meet the requirements, thus introducing an additional bias.
Undoubtedly favoritism and corruption sometimes occur in the
award of contracts. These problems are countered by using in-
dependent companies, such as Crown Agents and C3D, as well
as the UNDP Overseas Procurement Office, to manage procure-
ment through the evaluation and award of tenders. Because the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Government Procurement4 7 is a
plurilateral agreement not covered by the Single Undertaking,
adherence is optional. Currently none of the Latin American
countries are signatories to this agreement.
To some extent, concerns about government procurement
practices will decrease as privatization of state-owned enter-
prises proceeds. Privatization, however, faces strong opposition
in many countries, and recently faced setbacks through political
and legal challenges in Brazil, Bolivia and Uruguay. Govern-
ments cannot currently privatize some sectors, especially the hy-
drocarbons sector, because of constitutional constraints.48
Nevertheless, there appears to be a reduced interest in priva-
tization, a sign of uncertainties in the industrialized world and
alternate opportunities in other regions where reforms are tak-
ing place (i.e., Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and
India).
47. Agreement on Government Procurement, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE, 26th Supp. BISD 33 (1980) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1981)
[hereinafter Government Procurement Code]. This Agreement was adopted as
part of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, in GATT SECRE:TA-
RIAT, THE REsuLTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS at 438, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994). A revised text, expected
to enter into force on January 1, 1996, is contained in document GPR/Spec/77
(Dec. 15, 1993).
48. See, e.g., MEX. CONST. art. 27.
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Domestic competition policies could come under scrutiny,
though they are not yet major issues throughout the hemi-
sphere. The monopolistic character of Latin American industry
may cause distribution problems for foreign countries trying to
penetrate Latin American markets. Typically, antitrust laws in
Latin American countries do not exist or are not applied.49
Much of industry, whether state-owned or tolerated monopolies
and oligopolies, charges what the market will bear. Foreign
competition will likely reduce this problem of monopoly rents.
However, for governments embarking on policies of trade liber-
alization, market imperfections will not be easily countered, es-
pecially in the short run. In October 1991, Argentina was forced
to deregulate its economy because the benefits of its trade liber-
alization were not being passed on to consumers. Peru recently
began to vigorously carry out its antitrust laws to help ensure
competition within the domestic economy.
Table 3 shows an overview of the sectoral breakdown of
trade measures imposed by the Latin American countries cov-
ered in Table 2. Non-automatic licensing and state monopolies
affect the importation of food and live animals, and the importa-
tion of fuels and automobiles. Few measures affect the importa-
tion of manufactured goods, except in the automotive sector
where local content plans and export-balancing requirements
still exist to reinforce the performance requirements of invest-
ment laws. Several countries continue to protect their automo-
tive assemblers through a combination of quotas, local-content
provisions, and export-performance-including trade-balanc-
ing-requirements. Generally, the restriction on imports of as-
sembled vehicles drives up the domestic price of finished
vehicles. While this encourages domestic production, the local-
content requirements and export-balancing requirements in-
crease the cost of production for the manufacturers.5 0 In addi-
tion, several countries ban the importation of used cars.
Automobiles are often four times the domestic price prevailing
in the U.S. market. Although most domestic companies are sub-
sidiaries of European or U.S. manufacturers, the parent compa-
nies seem to favor these rules as protecting their local
49. Some countries in the region have adopted UNCTAD's proposed "model
law" on restrictive business practices, but there is little indication of serious
application.
50. For a review of protective regimes in Latin America, see THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY (Rich Kronish &
Kenneth S. Mericle eds., 1984).
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investments.51 Such measures also provide a subtle form of pro-
tection against Japanese manufacturers. To some extent, how-
ever, this protection is undercut by the apparent consolidation of
the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)52 as a precursor
to a more open market in the Cono Sur.
Direct export or production subsidies (i.e., financial grants),
used to varying degrees, were typically less important than
other subsidy elements that encouraged domestic export-ori-
ented investment, including tax rebates and export finance
schemes. In addition, state-owned manufacturing enterprises
operated under less than full cost recovery, and occasionally still
do, such as the iron and steel sectors. Most developing countries
are currently eliminating or reducing the deficits in central gov-
ernment or consolidated public accounts, and thus can no longer
afford direct government payment schemes. The emphasis has
shifted to the precise rebate of domestic taxes (partly to avoid
countervailing action), temporary admission schemes, and the
improvement of infrastructure facilities by privatizing ports,
railways, shipping, and service industries such as banking and
telecommunications that provide inputs to the manufacturing
sector.
Countries still using direct or indirect export subsidies in-
clude Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela. On the other hand,
several countries apply export taxes. Argentina continues to ap-
ply a 6% tax on oilseeds exports, in addition to a 10% statistical
tax (also on imports), and a 1.5% tax on all agricultural exports
to support the National Institute for Agricultural Technology
(INTA).53 Costa Rica taxes exports of bananas and coffee. 54
Export restrictions or taxes on agricultural products were
used for a variety of reasons: to capture "monopoly rents" where
a large exporter influenced world prices (i.e., exporters of
oilseeds and various metals); to ensure lowcost supplies of raw
materials for domestic processing industries (i.e., hides and
skins); and to keep down domestic prices of foodstuffs (i.e.,
wheat and beef prices). Argentina continues to ban exports of
raw hides and skins and tax exports of some vegetable oilseeds.
Other countries have similar policies. While these practices al-
51. Some "investments" appear to be plants required to produce models
previously scrapped in the developed country markets. These types of invest-
ments give the impression that the region has traveled 20 years back in time.
52. MERCOSUR, supra note 26.
53. TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF ARGENTINA 1992, supra note 22, vol. I, at 117-
19.
54. TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF COSTA RICA 1995, supra note 24.
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low the availability of items to domestic processors at prices be-
low world levels, the practices are not considered subsidies
under the GATT. Nevertheless, the practices still provoke pro-
tests among processors in industrial countries, including proces-
sors in the United States and the European Community.
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The recent commitment by the Clinton Administration to
begin negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) re-
solved any doubts about the Administration's intention to pur-
sue the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Similarly, the
invitation to Chile to enter formal negotiations for accession to
NAFTA quelled speculation that this agreement might be a non-
starter.55 Doubts had previously emerged regarding U.S. com-
mitment to further trade liberalization on a regional basis. The
difficult congressional passage of NAFTA and the debate on rati-
fication of the Uruguay Round agreements reinforced this uncer-
tainty. It is expected that the Administration will seek a fast-
track authority from the now Republican-dominated Congress
before beginning serious FTAA negotiations.
Enthusiasm for an FTAA is not uniform among the develop-
ing countries of the region. Caribbean countries feel disadvan-
taged by NAFTA and could view the FTAA as a way of
redressing the imbalance; however, they currently have stronger
protectionist policies than exist elsewhere in Latin America.
Brazilian officials argued that joining NAFTA would cause Latin
American countries to "lose their capacity for adopting autono-
mous policies in sensitive areas such as investment, services and
intellectual property."56 Brazil also sees MERCOSUR, with fu-
ture free trade partners in South America, as a rival to NAFTA.
An FTAA would extend trade liberalization beyond that cur-
rently agreed to under the MERCOSUR common external tariff
(implemented with some exceptions on January 1, 1995). Im-
port-competing sectors, such as the capital goods sector, the au-
tomobile sector, and even the agricultural goods sector, would
come under greater adjustment pressures. Finally, some coun-
tries see an FTAA as an opportunity to gain access to the U.S.
55. NAFTA "Amigos' Invite Chile to Begin Accession Talks, 11 Intl Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1914 (Dec. 14, 1994).
56. Stephen Fidler & George Graham, Bonds that Bind a Hemisphere:
Latin America and the U.S. Are Agreed on the Importance of Regional Trade,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at 25 (quoting Rubens Barbosa, Brazil's Ambassador
to London).
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market, similar to Mexico's access. Apart from the Declaration
of Principles, which goes far beyond trade issues, the countries
at the Miami Summit agreed on a Plan of Action.57 The Plan
calls for comprehensive agreements on tariff and non-tariff bar-
riers to trade, agriculture, subsidies, investment, intellectual
property, rules of origin, antidumping duties, sanitary stan-
dards, dispute settlement, and competition policy. The Plan
asks the Organization of American States and the Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank to lead future discussions, and schedules
meetings of trade ministers to work on the FTAA in June 1995
and March 1996.
Prior NAFTA negotiations suggest the potential content of
the FTAA.58 The NAFTA experience and the FTAA Plan of Ac-
tion are evidence that negotiations might be as comprehensive
as the recent Uruguay Round negotiations. Certain issues
would likely be given even more weight in the FTAA than in the
Uruguay Round. While adherence to the Government Procure-
ment Code 59 may remain optional under the WTO, the United
States wants to see additional Latin American advances. The
United States favors improved investment opportunities in
countries where investment is subject to restrictions. Similarly,
although discriminatory internal taxes have not become an is-
sue under GATT, they would likely receive scrutiny in the FTAA
negotiations. 60 Several countries thus may need to contemplate
the elimination of the discriminatory application of internal
taxes.
During the 1960s, Latin American countries established
several regional arrangements with little success. The main ef-
forts were the LAFTA, the Andean Pact (a subgroup of LAFTA),
and the CACM. Jaime de Melo and Sumana Dhar offer several
57. Summit of the Americas, Plan of Action, Dec. 9-11, 1994 (on file with
the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
58. For a discussion of the NAFTA negotiations, see FREE TRADE AREAS
AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1989).
59. Government Procurement Code, supra note 47.
60. GATT permits the application of internal charges to imports. GATT
1947, supra note 4, art. IfI:l. Such charges, however, should not be applied to
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.
Id. This implies that internal charges on imported products should not be in
excess of charges applied to domestic products. Id. art. 111:2. Fees charged to
cover the costs of entry procedures are permitted. Id. art. H:2(c). These fees,
however, are not meant to provide indirect protection to domestic producers or
taxation of imports or exports for fiscal purposes. Id. art. VIII:1(a).
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reasons why these regional arrangements failed. 61 First, trade-
barrier reductions were not across-the-board but on a product-
by-product basis, resulting in many exceptions. 62 Second, high
rates of protection were maintained against outside countries.6 3
Third, there was little scope for efficiency gains, because of the
inability to exploit economies of scale through product limita-
tions, and the fact that all producers were high-cost by interna-
tional standards.64 Therefore, the early regional arrangements
were essentially designed for trade diversion and resulted in a
decrease, rather than an increase, in welfare. Rolf Langhammer
and Ulrich Hiemenz reviewed studies of the trade effects of the
arrangements and confirmed that the main result was trade di-
version rather than trade creation.6 5
Before the Miami Summit, there was a resurgence of inter-
est in regionalism extending not only to trade in goods but also
encompassing trade in services and mutual investment opportu-
nities and guarantees. Attempts are now being made to revive
the Andean Group and the CACM, though some individual
member states currently have lower tariffs than the external
tariff: Peru and Bolivia for the Andean Group and Costa Rica
for the CACM. Mexico alone has signed free trade agreements
with Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, the CACM, and Bolivia.
Colombia and Venezuela have signed a free trade agreement.
The CACM has signed a free trade agreement with Colombia
and Venezuela.
The most ambitious of these new regional arrangements is
MERCOSUR, which entered into force on November 29, 1991.
The treaty provided for the establishment of a common market
with the free circulation of goods, services, capital and labor, be-
ginning January 1, 1995.66 Article 5 states that the liberaliza-
tion program will consist of "progressive, linear and automatic
tariff reductions accompanied by the elimination of non-tariff re-
strictions or equivalent measures... with a view to arriving at a
zero tariff and no non-tariff restrictions for the entire tariff area
61. See JAIME DE MELO & SUMANA DHAR, LESSONS OF TRADE LIBERALIZA-
TION IN LATIN AMERICA FOR ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 34 (The World Bank, Pol-
icy Research WPS 1040, 1992).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See ROLF J. LANGHAMMER & ULRICH HIEMENZ, REGIONAL INTEGRATION
AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: OPPORTUNITIES, OBSTACLES AND OPTIONS 22-
33 (1990).
66. MERCOSUR, supra note 26, art. 1.
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by 31 December 1994."67 After five years, the treaty will open to
new members. 68 Although each member established a few ex-
ceptions from the general liberalization, these exceptions are to
be generally eliminated by the time the customs union is com-
pleted. Member countries had different perceptions about com-
mon trade and industrial policy; it took until August 1994 to
establish a compromise on the level and nature of the common
external tariff, effective January 1995 for 85% of trade.
Since the start of MERCOSUR, the increased level of trade
exceeded expectations. The arrangement's success piqued other
countries' interest in joining or forming some kind of closer asso-
ciation. Chile and Bolivia have now signaled an interest in join-
ing. Brazil, in particular, views MERCOSUR as the core of a
wider South American free trade area.69 Members will negoti-
ate with the European Union on a possible free trade agree-
ment,70 and there has been mention of an association with the
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC).71
Despite previous failures, 72 there are several reasons to be-
lieve that the renewed interest in regionalism, culminating in
negotiations for the FTAA, will lead to more successful results in
the future. As previously discussed, countries in the region have
undertaken considerable trade liberalization on an autonomous
basis. The new arrangements have much less scope for trade
diversion and will no longer look inward. Moreover, under the
liberalization programs, the restructuring of regional industries
should allow the industries to approximate world levels of effi-
ciency. The new intra-regional trade will offer real opportuni-
ties for economies of scale and specialization. Finally, the new
arrangements have greater political credibility as they are
viewed as a consolidation of the unilateral reforms.
The principal challenge lies in ensuring that exceptions are
kept to a strict minimum and phased out within a predeter-
mined period according to a fixed timetable. Local-content pro-
67. Id. art. 5.
68. Id. art. 20.
69. See Chile Intends to Seek Membership in MERCOSUR, Foreign Minis-
ter Says, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 911 (June 8, 1994) (noting the
proposal of Brazilian President Itamar Franco for the establishment of a South
American Free Trade Area to include all the countries of South America).
70. Fidler & Graham, supra note 56, at 25.
71. Alain Boebion, Derniers preparatifs pour le Mercosur [Final Prepara-
tions for Mercosuri, LE FIGARo, Dec. 15, 1994, at XIII.
72. Apart from earlier unsatisfactory sub-regional arrangements, a free
trade agreement in the Americas by 1985 was an ambition of the previous re-
gional summit held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1967.
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visions and export-balancing requirements will probably remain
for some period in the main manufacturing sector, with poten-
tial exceptions for intra-regional trade. Eventually such re-
quirements will be limited by the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS),73 due to be im-
plemented within five years by developing countries. Moreover,
non-adherence to the plurilateral Uruguay Round Agreement on
Government Procurement74 will remain a concern as long as im-
portant sectors (such as the iron and steel, chemicals and petro-
chemicals industries) continue to have high levels of state
ownership. Perceived subsidization, already an international
problem, could easily sour economic relations in regional agree-
ments, because the products of these industries are homogene-
ous in nature and small price variations can cause large-scale
switching of supplies. Problems might also arise with local pref-
erences in government procurement, especially in countries with
extensive state ownership.
Inevitably, charges and taxes levied at the frontier, other
than tariffs, will become a large-scale issue. This issue first sur-
faced when Argentina increased the statistical tax from 3% to
10%, even against other MERCOSUR members. 75 While techni-
cally permissible under MERCOSUR, this increase was so unex-
pected that Paraguay announced its intention to boycott
meetings under the arrangement. There is still a wide range of
trade-related taxes and charges throughout the region, includ-
ing some domestic taxes applied discriminately against
imports. 76
CONCLUSION
The most striking developments in Latin America in recent
years are twofold. First, the extent and speed of unilateral liber-
alization reforms; second, the drive to consolidate those reforms
through trade agreements with other countries, culminating in
the FTAA proposal. Nine Latin American countries recently ac-
ceded to the multilateral system of the GATT, thereby binding
some of their reforms. In the Uruguay Round, these countries
73. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, opened for signa-
ture Apr. 15, 1994, in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MuLTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS at 163, GATr Sales No. 1994-4
(1994).
74. See Government Procurement Code, supra note 47.
75. What Kind of Ties Within Mercosul? LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL RE-
PORTS-BRAzIL, Nov. 25, 1993, at 6.
76. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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and other Latin American contracting parties to the GATT com-
mitted themselves to several changes in the application of an-
tidumping measures (not all for the better) and customs
valuation procedures that will ensure that the reform process
moves forward. However, markets remain less contestable than
desired because of the continued dominance of certain state-
owned enterprises, weak government procurement procedures,
and the lack of a strong competition policy. There is also a need
for greater scrutiny of import charges unrelated to the cost of
services and other anti-trade taxes.
The Uruguay Round brought moderate improvements in
market access and greater security and protection for developing
countries under the new rules and disciplines. The Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative opened the enticing prospect of im-
proved access to the U.S. market, and the FTAA Declaration and
Plan of Action resolved any doubts about the intentions of the
Clinton Administration. Prior doubts about U.S. intentions in-
creased the attractiveness of regional agreements that could
modestly help consolidate domestic reforms. Such agreements,
including an FTAA, have their limitations, and there is a danger
of disillusionment from expecting too much from them. First,
there are still many trade measures that could prevent the reali-
zation of expected trade gains. Second, there is the potential
abuse of escape clause provisions, like the abuse of antidumping
actions to harass successful exporters. Third, recent experiences
in Argentina and Brazil show that movements in relative ex-
change and interest rates can cause major fluctuations in trade
and financial flows, producing political tensions and new trade
measures, even by reform-minded governments. 77 Indeed,
MERCOSUR makes explicit provisions for consultations on eco-
nomic policies, although it is far from clear how coordination can
be made more effective.
77. Argentina has a fixed exchange rate anchored to the U.S. dollar, while
Brazil had a floating exchange rate until the 1994 introduction of the real,
which is also fixed to the U.S. dollar. Between 1991 and 1994, the Argentine
currency thus appreciated against the Brazilian currency, making exporting to
Brazil more difficult. This was partly overcome by Brazilian "special efforts" to
buy more from Argentina (e.g., through state-owned enterprises). Corrective
Argentinean import measures, such as an increase in the statistical tax on im-
ports and controls on paper imports, caused severe strains within MERCOSUR.
Trouble Ahead: Mood Changes, LATIN AM. ECON. & Bus., Apr. 1994, at 4; Wor-
ries About Imports: IMF Targets Missed, LATIN AM. ECON. & Bus., Oct. 1993, at
10. Since the change in Brazilian exchange rate policy, trade has become more
balanced.
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If implementation of the FTAA succeeds, the agreement will
overtake and remove many concerns about complex, overlap-
ping, and exception-filled arrangements within the region. De-
veloping countries in the region will need to move further and
faster than previously anticipated, particularly if accords are
also reached with the European Union and APEC. A wider lib-
eralization reduces the risks of trade diversion, although it will
be more challenging than the easy seduction of sub-regional
agreements. It is important to recall that these reforms were
not undertaken for mercantilist goals of improved market access
in trade negotiations, but rather to support macroeconomic sta-
bilization, improved resource allocation, and reduced anti-export
biases. Extensive trade agreements across the hemisphere and
beyond can contribute to these goals, which can subsequently be
locked in place under future WTO negotiations.

